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Abstract
In this note we analyze a simple game model of effort and time investment in an arranged
marriage where the goal of the two partners making this investment is to create a better marital
relationship. We first specify the best response functions of the two married partners. Next, we solve
for the Nash equilibrium and then argue that this equilibrium is unique. Finally, we delineate an
interesting connection between the two best response functions in our model and the corresponding
best response functions in the well known two-player Cournot game. 
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3See Manser and Brown [2], Peters [3], and Cornelius [4] for a more detailed corroboration of this claim. In addition, note that if the
process of arranging a marriage is viewed as a matching problem then the von Neumann and Morgenstern notion of stability is
potentially relevant. See Greenberg et al. [5] for more details on this last point.
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1. Introduction
Gary Becker [1] was the first researcher to apply modern economic analysis to comprehend
the institution of marriage from a theoretical standpoint. Since Becker’s seminal work, several
economists have studied the subject of marriage from a variety of perspectives.3 However, these
studies have typically focused on marriages in the western world, that is, on the so called “love
marriages.” 
Even so, as Levine et al. [6], Kumar and Dhyani [7], and others have pointed out, “arranged
marriages” are popular in many nations including, but not limited to, India, Pakistan, and Thailand.
An arranged marriage is a marriage in which the two individuals intending to get married do not
look for a partner by themselves. Instead, parents, other family members, friends, and even
matchmakers look for suitable partners. Even though arranged marriages are common in many parts
of the world, the theoretical study of arranged marriages began only with Batabyal [8]. Since then,
additional papers by Batabyal ([9], [10]), Batabyal and Beladi [11], and Liu [12] have examined a
variety of pertinent issues such as the impact of a probabilistic reservation quality level on decision
making in arranged marriages, the role of meetings and exposure before an arranged marriage, and
the conditions under which one ought to have an arranged as opposed to a love marriage. 
The studies mentioned in the preceding paragraph have certainly advanced our understanding
of several aspects of arranged marriages. Even so, it is important to emphasize that these studies are
all prospective in the sense that they analyze the behavior of agents seeking to have an arranged
marriage and not those who are already in an arranged marriage. Put differently, to the best of our
4knowledge, there are no theoretical studies of the activities of agents who are currently in an
arranged marriage. Given this lacuna in the literature, the objective of this note is to analyze the
strategic interaction between two married partners who invest effort and time in order to create a
better marital relationship or, alternately, to make their arranged marriage work.
Clearly, if a better marital relationship is to be created then all marriages—love or
arranged—need investments of effort and time. However, in a love marriage, the married partners
generally spend a good amount of a time together—dating and possibly even living together—before
they get married. In contrast, this is typically not the case for partners wishing to have an arranged
marriage. Therefore, the two partners in an arranged marriage are significantly more unfamiliar with
each other. As a result, Liu [12], Bentley [13], Barker [14], and Anonymous [15] have all rightly
noted that the effort and time investment problem is particularly salient in the case of arranged
marriages. This observation explains why we concentrate on the effort and time investment problem
in the context of arranged marriages.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the static game model.
Section 2.2 specifies the best response functions of the two married partners. Section 2.3 first solves
for the Nash equilibrium and then contends that this equilibrium is unique. Section 2.4 delineates
an interesting connection between the two best response functions in our model and the
corresponding best response functions in the well known two-player Cournot game. Section 3
concludes and then suggests two ways in which the research in this note might be extended.
2. Analysis
2.1. The game model
Consider two individuals or partners who are together in an arranged marriage. The objective
5of each partner is to invest effort and time in order to create a better marital relationship. Even
though effort and time are, in principle, two distinct notions, in the remainder of this note, we use
a single variable to model both these notions. Specifically, in our model, each partner invests 
and if both partners invest more then we suppose that both partners are better off. There is typically
some element of strategy in the interaction between the two married partners. In addition, it is costly
for each partner to invest. To account for these two features of the problem, we suppose that the
concave utility function of partner  from investment levels  is given by 
(1)
where  can be thought of as a shift variable. Note that the utility function in equation (1) tells
us that the greater is the investment of effort and time by one partner, the more valuable is effort and
time investment by the other partner. Let us now specify the best response functions of the two
married partners.
2.2. The best response functions
If partner  believes that partner  will select  then (s)he solves
(2)
The first order necessary condition for an optimum is
(3)
Therefore, partner  best response function is given by
(4)
We can now compute the Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the game between the two married
6partners. 
2.3. The Nash equilibrium
Inspecting equation (4), it is clear that the two best response functions are given by
(5)
Solving these two best response functions simultaneously for the two unknowns, we get
(6)
In words, the optimal investment of effort and time by each of the two partners equals the constant
shift variable  Inspecting equation (6), it is straightforward to confirm that this Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies, is unique. This is because  is the only point at which the two best
response functions given in equation (5) intersect. Our last task in this note is to point out an
interesting link between the two best response functions in equation (5) and the corresponding best
response functions in the well known two-player Cournot game. 
2.4. A connection
In the prominent Cournot game between two quantity setting players (firms)—see, for
instance, equation 5.2 in Tadelis [16, p. 87]—the more that firm 2 produces, the lower is the best
response quantity produced by firm 1. Put differently, the best response of firm 1 is decreasing in
the quantity choice of firm 2. In game-theoretic parlance, the quantity choices of the two firms are
strategic substitutes. 
In contrast, in the game that we are analyzing, equation (5) clearly shows that the effort and
time investment of married partner 1 is increasing in the corresponding investment of married
7partner 2. Once again in game-theoretic language, this means that the investment choices of the two
partners are strategic complements. In this sense, the game that we have been analyzing thus far is
similar to the Bertrand game in which the two players (firms) select prices optimally. This completes
our analysis of the “make an arranged marriage work” game. 
3. Conclusions
We shall not repeat our basic conclusions from section 2. Having said this, our main
summary point is that in this note, we examined a simple game model of effort and time investment
in an arranged marriage where the goal of the two partners making this investment was to create a
better marital relationship. The analysis conducted here can be extended in a variety of ways. Here
are two possible extensions. First, it would be useful to study a dynamic game model in which the
two partners are interested not only in creating a better marital relationship but also in maintaining
this relationship over time so as to potentially avoid a negative outcome like a divorce. Second, it
would also be instructive to study scenarios in which the utility functions of the two partners depend
not only on personal choice variables but also on variables that reflect the wishes of near and dear
family members. Studies that examine these aspects of the problem will shed valuable additional
light on the working of arranged marriages.
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